Fightin’ Fridays: The 6th Seaforth Highlanders in Champagne

By Derek Bird

Excerpted from “The Spirit of the Troops Is Excellent: The 6^th (Morayshire) Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, in the Great War 1914-1919” http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/wfasnb/research05.htm

In (July 1918) the Germans had been making significant advances (in France) and now held a large salient that bulged into the French lines, but they had already been brought to a halt by the combined efforts of French, American and Italian divisions. As the situation was still developing at the time of the Highland Division’s assembly a number of changes to plan had to be made before it was decided to concentrate near Epernay, south of Reims, about four miles from the furthest point of the German advance. This put the division on the south-east side of the salient and provided them with the unusual experience of advancing in a north-westerly direction. The 62^nd (2^nd West Riding) Division would be operating alongside them, and the other British divisions sent to help the French, the 15^th (Scottish) and 34^th, would be some miles away on the wide side of the salient near Soissons. In yet another change of plan it was decided to move the Highlanders north of the River Marne and so at 6:30 on the morning of the 19^th the 152^nd Brigade marched to Champillon, where they rested until 10 p.m. before marching on to the assembly points for an attack the following morning.

At dawn on the 20 July the 153^rd and 154^th Brigades launched the attack, with the 6^th Seaforth remaining in the rear as part of the divisional reserve. In front of the 153^rd Brigade lay the Bois de Courton, a tangled mass of woods some 3,500 yards deep. Both brigades advanced through the German outpost line without serious resistance, but the fighting in the Bois de Courton became very confused with, at best, the men only able to see about 50 yards through the trees and extremely vulnerable to ambush by the enemy. The 17^th Gordons and the 1/6^th and 1/7^th Black Watch all plunged into the woods but soon became split up into small parties.  By the afternoon it became obvious that these three battalions had become badly intermingled so at 6:30 p.m. the 6^th Seaforth were placed under the command of the 153^rd Brigade. They were ordered to move forward to the newly won positions that ran north-east from a point just east of the hamlet of Paradis to allow the 153^rd Brigade to withdraw and reorganise. The hand-over did go well as it was a very dark and wet night and the guides got lost. Nevertheless the 6^th Seaforth did manage to get into position by about 4 a.m. the 21^st. Following the withdrawal of the 153^rd Brigade the task of continuing the advance was given to the 152^nd Brigade. As the first part of this plan the 6^th Seaforth were moved slightly to the rear to allow the 1/5 Seaforth and 1/6 Gordons to pass through. Throughout the morning the men of the Morayshire battalion were subjected to heavy shell fire that caused about 60 casualties.

July 21 was another day of difficult fighting in the forest and at about 2 p.m. orders were given for the 6^th Seaforth to advance. The Morayshire battalion was ordered to support the 1/5 Seaforth and 1/6 Gordons, paying particular attention to ensuring that the flanks were adequately covered. The left front was reinforced when ‘A’ Company was joined up with the 1/5 Seaforth, ‘B’ Company went to the right front, and ‘D’ Company to the right flank, ‘C’ Company was kept in reserve. Once ‘A’ Company had got in touch with the 1/5 Seaforth they pushed patrols forward and discovered that, although the line had advanced about 200 yards, both Paradis and La Neuville-Aux-Larris were still in enemy hands. ‘B’ Company advanced and actually made contact with the enemy before finding the 1/6 Gordons at about 5 p.m. Meanwhile ‘D’ Company advanced through the wood until halted by heavy machine-gun fire. They then took up positions facing north. One platoon of ‘C’ Company was sent forward to help ‘D’ Company at about 5 p.m., but was withdrawn again the following morning. The Germans continued to pound the British lines with shells all through the night, including the use of gas shells in the early hours of the 22^nd.

That morning at 2:30 a.m. a conference was held at Brigade HQ where the commanding officers were briefed on the next stage of the attack. The 152^nd Brigade was to take over positions currently held by the 154^rd Brigade between the Bois de Courton and the River Ardre and prepare to advance at 6 a.m. the next morning. Company commanders were briefed at Battalion HQ at 5 a.m. and details were worked out. The 6^th Seaforth started moving out of the forest at 10:30 a.m. and were at the start positions by 1 p.m. on the 23^rd. The 1/5 Seaforth were on the right extending the line up to the bank of the Ardre. The 1/6 Gordons who had been heavily engaged deep in the forest only arrived shortly before Zero hour, minus one company that had been relieved too late. They took their place on the left up to the edge of the Bois de Courton.

The joint British and French artillery barrage opened at 6 a.m. but some of the shells fell short with the rear of the barrage falling only 40 yards ahead of ‘B’ Company’s positions. To their left it fell upon both ‘C’ Company and the 1/6 Gordons positions causing many casualties, one company of the latter losing all its officers before the advance began. Five minutes after the garage opened the German artillery retaliated, but most of their shells fell 250 yards behind the Highlanders’ positions.  As soon as it was realized that British shells were falling short and ‘C’ Company was suffering casualties, ‘A’ Company was moved in behind them to provide support. Once the infantry advance got underway, ‘B’ Company on the right made good headway with a minimum of casualties until they reached their objectives north-west of the Bois De L’Aunaie. Here they were subjected to heavy shell and machine-gun fire while they were digging in and suffered many casualties, including Captain John Mackintosh their commander. ‘C’ Company on the left suffered badly from both the artillery barrage falling short and from enemy machine-gun fire coming from their left flank. This company lost all its officers before reaching the spur south of the Bois De L’Aunaie. Some of the battalion continued to fight on through the objective and formed a new line in the sunken road 300 yards south of the wood.

‘D’ Company, in support, moved forward to  the Bois De L’Aunaie and started digging in, but after being subjected to heavy enemy shelling they retired a short distance and dug a series of posts just short of the wood. ‘A’ Company took up positions in the sunken road, and also established posts on the spur covering the southern edge of the wood.  At about 2 p.m. two platoons of the 1/7 Argylls were attached to the 6^th Seaforth to help fill in the gap that had developed between the two leading companies, but the heavy enemy artillery barrage forced them to retire again. At dusk the 1/5 Seaforth put out a number of posts that connected the sunken road with the rest of their battalion which had, by then, moved forward to a line just inside the western edge of the wood. The 6^th Seaforth had suffered heavily with 21 men killed, but they had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and had captured 45 prisoners, along with 3 heavy and 15 light machine-guns. Due to the large numbers of casualties the two Seaforth battalions were reorganised with the 1/5 Seaforth forming two composite companies, and the 6^th Seaforth being combined into a single company.

For the next three days the brigade maintained its position but throughout the period, especially on the afternoon of the 26th, they continued to suffer casualties from both high explosive and gas shells. On the 27th the advance was renewed; after intense fighting, the 6th Seaford were withdrawn from the field on the 28th.

…

The Highland Division’s units left the area (in early July). In 11 days of hard fighting the Highlanders had helped to stem the German attack, and then pushed them back for four and a half miles, engaging at times no less than six different enemy divisions. What makes their achievement even more remarkable is that for many this was their first battle, a large percentage of the division was now being made up by youngsters drafted in to replace the casualties of the March and April fighting. General Henri Berthelot, GOC French Fifth Army, wrote in his order of the day 30 July 1918:

Your French comrades will always remember with emotion your splendid gallantry and perfect fellowship in the fight.

Highland troops march past French General Berthelot after the fighting in Champagne. National Library of Scotland digital photo..

 

 

The 4-wheeled Heroes of the Marne

The New York Times has a fine article about the taxis of Paris that were rushed to the Front in September 1914:

On the evening of Sept. 6, hundreds of cabs assembled at Les Invalides, the military hospital, and by morning a convoy of impossibly top-heavy Renault AG1s with tiny 1.2-liter 2-cylinder engines was puttering toward the front.

By the end of Sept. 7, some 600 taxis, each making several runs, had delivered 3,000 troops. It is not known whether the passengers tipped the cabbies — but they tipped the battle to the French.

Here’s the link: www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/automobiles/100-years-later

Photo by Amelien Bayle, posted at Flickr.

Fightin’ Friday: The Affair at Nery

 

The Affair at Nery: Sept. 1, 1914, reprinted from Camaraderie

By Paul F. Guthrie

Our U.S. Branch WFA 2007 tour included a tour of British action at the beginning of the war featuring the fighting around Mons and the retreat.  It ended at the Battle of Le Cateau of Sept. 25, 1914.

The next action of any significance was the affair at Nery. It’s a fascinating encounter and one of the best visits on the entire Western Front because the approaches to the village, the village itself and the surrounding fields are unchanged since the battle.

Why is it called the affair at Nery rather than the battle of Nery?  It’s a matter of battlefield nomenclature, because the British Army didn’t feel the action was large enough to be called a battle.  It was the first time in the war that the British were in control of the battlefield after the action.  It was fought almost entirely by cavalry units on both sides, with the Germans having superiority of numbers of about two to one.

The main street of the village runs from north to south.  The north of the village was defended from German attack by the C Squadron of the Fifth Dragoon Guards and their machine guns.  A bit further south was the headquarters of the First Cavalry Brigade, which was the larger unit participating in the battle.  Just a bit south is the village church where the 11^th Hussars had its headquarters and established a strong defense along the church with machine guns and rifle fire.  At the south end of the village on the west side of the road were the Queen’s Bays, and on the east side of the road L Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, which achieved fame and two Victoria Crosses.

Further south and beyond the village is a sugar factory.  Just to the east of the village is a deep ravine.

The German Third Cavalry Brigade approached from that direction.  At the north side of the village were the 9^th Uhlans, who formed a dismounted firing line, and the 2^nd Cuirassiers who did the same.  Firing against L Battery and the Queen’s Bays, were the 18^th Dragoons of the 17^th Cavalry Brigade.  All of these units were part of the 4^th Cavalry Division which had its headquarters about 1,000 yards to the east of the village.  It was a British brigade against a German division.

The Queen’s Bays were one of the oldest cavalry regiments in the British Army, having been raised by James II to deal with the Monmouth Rebellion in June 1685.  Originally the regiment was named the Queen’s Regiment of Horse, and it was a matter of pride that all the horses were bays.  The regiment served for much of its history in India. During the Great Sepoy Mutiny, it won three VCs and took part in a famous cavalry charge during the relief of Lucknow in 1858.

One Royal Horse Artillery battery of six 13-pounder horse-drawn guns was attached to each cavalry brigade.  L Battery was commanded by Maj. Walter Sclater-Booth, who had taken command in 1910, and the battery captain was Edward Bradbury.  This unit of five officers, almost 200 men and 228 horses was organized into three sections. Each had two modern quick-firing 13-pounder guns with buffer recoil systems and bullet-proof shields. They could fire 15 rounds a minute. Each section was accompanied by two ammunition wagons.  The battery had seen considerable action after enduring the Battle of Mons.

On August 31, the First Cavalry Brigade was directed to Nery.  They arrived there about 6 p.m. The horses had been watered earlier, since it was thought there would not be sufficient water at Nery.

German cavalry were to make a night attack against Nery.  They were quite tired and suffered a number of other disadvantages before beginning the attack.  The division had suffered considerable casualties in the advance through Belgium. The Germans had sacrificed support for speed, and the division was lacking much of its logistics, including support transport, ammunition wagons, lead horses, etc.

German cavalry units by doctrine were to be supported by infantry and horse artillery that closely followed the advancing cavalry. The unit that was to attack Nery had no infantry, and six machine guns were also absent.

In German cavalry doctrine, mounted action would take place primarily against other cavalry, not infantry.  It is true that in this attack the German cavalry was fighting British cavalry but, the Germans were armed with carbines, smaller less effective versions of the rifle carried by the infantry. Contrarily, the British carried the standard Lee-Enfield infantry weapon, and the firepower of the individual soldier was much greater.

The Fourth Cavalry Division rode all through the heat of the day on August 31^st and following night without a stop for food or rest apart from one 2-hour stop.  At 5 a.m., the general in charge, von Garnier, ordered an immediate mounted attack designed to surprise and destroy the British forces with overwhelming shell fire and mounted flanking attacks.

Visibility was poor and hampered the German artillery, but the attack did achieve surprise.  At the beginning of the attack, L Battery was quite shot up with tethered horses and men suffering equally.  However, it was able to return fire fairly quickly.

The farm to the right of the Nery church was defended by the 11^th Hussars.  Then and now it doesn’t look like what we think of as a farm.  It rather looks like a series of fortified buildings.   It suffered a lot less in the initial attack than the units at the south of the village.

Battery lines had been laid out neatly for the night with each section of two guns and their horses and limbers in line.  This was the first time this had been done on the retreat and an indication that the battery felt secure.  Following reveille at 2:30 a.m., the battery prepared for meeting out at 4:30 a.m., but because of the dense mist prevailing that morning, headquarters ordered a stand still until 5 a.m. which was extended till 5:30. Thus L Battery was still in place when attacked.

The surprise of the attack could hardly have been greater.  The battery’s horses were standing in march order with their poles down. Shrapnel exploding among the horses and men was horrific, causing panic among the horses which drove their lowered poles into the ground, trapping them until they were shot down.  The terrified horses could not be released easily from their harnesses, and were killed.

There was chaos with limbers and wagons overturned.  Despite efforts by their crews, B, C and D guns were knocked out, leaving the F gun in action.  The ammunition supply was in wagons 20 yards from the gun and collecting it meant crossing an open space with machine gun fire and shrapnel, but it was done.

L Battery kept up its effort until almost 8 a.m. when I Battery arrived and began firing.  It was firing only shrapnel, but the shrapnel had a wicked effect on the Germans opposing.  It forced the Germans to concentrate all their guns to the south of Nery.   Resistance of the gunners of L Battery, against all odds, was the key to the survival of the First Cavalry Brigade that morning.

The First Dragoon Guards were also effective in preventing Third Brigade from succeeding its attack further north.

The Queen’s Bays (2^nd Dragoon Bays) provided very significant support to the men of L Battery.   On the south side of the village there are memorials to both units.  Seven men were all that were available to man the Queen’s Bays machine guns, but they did so to great effect.

Every unit arrived in support of the British and once I Battery commenced firing, the rest of the German guns fell silent. The Germans attempted to bring up horse teams to get the guns away but came under fire from the guns of I Battery and the machine guns of the Queen’s Bays. Despite valiant effort, they were unable to get their horses close enough to get all the guns away.  Four were extracted, but eight were captured.

By 9 a.m., it was clear to General von Garnier that the situation was very dangerous for his division with the apparent hapless enemy not being overcome, and in fact being reinforced.  Four infantry brigades and another cavalry brigade were gathering to attack, and it was becoming dangerous to remain at Nery.  He thus decided to recall his units from their attack position as quickly as possible and concentrate his division, and the Germans retreated, leaving the British in control of the battlefield.  This is the first time during the war this had happened but, of course, the retreat was resumed shortly.

The Fourth Cavalry Divisions likely suffered about 200 casualties, about twice those of the British.  The affair did have a deleterious effect on the Germans and gave the British reason to believe that under the right conditions they could still win.

The failure of their action at Nery and the futility of cavalry charging sound defensive positions manned by well-trained men with modern rifles and machine guns confirmed to the Germans the value of having supporting infantry integrated with the cavalry.

For the cavalry on both sides, the attack proved the acclamation of the critical importance of ground reconnaissance before charging boldly at the enemy.

Memorial to the British officers and men killed at Nery on Sept. 1, 1914. About 55 British troops were killed.

 

The only gun to survive the German artillery, it belongs to the Imperial War Museum.

WWI family stories wanted

Does your family have a story to tell?

From the IAJGS International Conference on Jewish Genealogy:

The theme of the upcoming IAJGS International Conference on Jewish Genealogy is the 100th Anniversary of the start of World War I. To commemorate this event, the Conference is offering registrants (both those who will attend the conference in Salt Lake City and those who register to access it LIVE! over the Internet) the chance to share their Family’s World War I era stories and photos. Stories may relate to military service, the disruption caused by fighting, forced relocation, emigration, or other topics related to this era.

Now is the time to write your story and gather your pictures. You may upload your story and related photos using the World War I Story Upload feature on the Conference website, www.iajgs2014.org . The purpose of this feature is to allow the Conference Committee to gather all of your stories and memories into a unique online exhibit and possibly a printed memory book. We also plan a World War I picture display at the Conference.

To use the World War I Story Upload Feature, you must first register for the conference. Then, use the Registration Update feature to upload your story and associated pictures. You will need your registration email and password to log into the Registration Update feature. If you have forgotten your password, the Registration Update page has a “Forgot password” function. We will periodically extract stories to share through social media (Discussion Forum, Blog, Facebook and Twitter). We envision cutting off updates as of June 15, 2014, to allow time to create the online exhibit for the conference.

Hal Bookbinder, Lead Conference co-Chair,
34th IAJGS International Conference on Jewish Genealogy
Salt Lake City, UT
7/27-8/1/2014
www.iajgs2014.org

Catch up on the news

Here’s our Jan/Feb newsletter:

http://ww1ha.org/pdf/WW1HA_Newsletter_Jan-Feb_2014.pdf

Fightin’ Friday: Mon Plaisir Farm

The Lightnings’ First Strike, reprinted from Camaraderie

By Neil M. Burns

On the night of Sept. 15, 1918, the green 78^th “Lightning” Division relieved the veteran 2nd Division north of Thiaucourt. The St. Mihiel offensive had just wound down, and the 2nd handed over little more than a collection of recently gained rifle pits in the Bois de Montagne.[i]  After some days spent consolidating their position, orders came down on the 21^st from the U.S. IV Corps calling for a raid in the early morning of the 22^nd.[ii]

This rather short notice made preparations difficult for the Division’s first real offensive operation. Mon Plaisir Farm was the hastily chosen target, about 800 yards away from the 78^th’s position, just inside the Hindenburg Line. The farm was a well-fortified observation point for the Germans, and the raid was to both gather prisoners and destroy the defensive works at the farm.[iii] The 310^th Infantry Regiment was to make the raid.

It was past noon on Sept. 21^st when runners from the 310^th Infantry’s Regimental Headquarters at Thiaucourt arrived summoning the 310^th’s battalion commanders. Once the battalion commanders arrived, Col. Babcock outlined the plan for the Third Battalion along with two platoons of the machine gun company, to attack on a 600 yard front.  Engineers were to clear paths through the barbed wire entanglements. A rolling barrage would precede the advance and the battalion would attack from a position 100 yards in front of the Bois de Montagne. During the raid a box barrage would isolate the German defenders by laying down a wall of shellfire to their rear and flanks. [iv] The battalion was to advance 100 yards beyond the farm and hold their position for 20 minutes. During this time, Company C of the 303^rd Engineers (78^th Division) were to destroy the defensive positions at the farm.[v]

Receiving the orders in midafternoon left little time for a proper reconnaissance. Regimental and battalion operations posts were established; the commander of the engineer company went over the terrain to request the proper supplies needed to clear the wire and destroy the pillboxes of the farm.[vi]

By 9 P.M.  Sept. 21^st the Second battalion had moved forward allowing the First battalion to relieve the Third battalion in the front line. At 11 P.M. the 3^rd battalion was assembling to the rear of their jumping off position. Midnight found the infantry ready and in position, but the engineers “failed to appear”.[vii] Apparently, there was some delay in reaching the assembly point, most likely due to the hurried nature of the raid. The loss of the engineer support removed half the original intention of the raid: the destruction of the farm’s defensive positions. Despite this, there seems to have been no serious thought of delaying or canceling the raid.

Following the rolling barrage at 1 A.M., the infantry moved up the slope to Mon Plaisir Farm. German flares shot up, calling for defensive artillery fire which began to fall on the First and Second battalions holding the U.S. lines. Companies L and M were in the first wave with company K in support and company I in reserve.[viii] Despite the uncleared barbed wire in their front, in some areas 20 feet wide, the 3^rd battalion managed to drive the Germans from the farm buildings by 1:20 A.M., clearing the trenches at bayonet point. The Germans, cut off from aid by the box barrage, were fighting hard but giving ground.

For 20 minutes the Third held their position until the withdrawal signal at 1:40 A.M. It was during the withdrawal that things began to go wrong. German machine guns on the flanks opened fire on the withdrawing infantry. Simultaneously, the German troops hurried to reoccupy the undestroyed defensive positions at Mon Plaisir Farm. This meant the retreating raiders were taking fire from three sides; thus, casualties began to mount. Thanks to the efforts of Sgt. Lawless and Corp. Amling of the attached machine gun company, some of the German machine guns were silenced.[ix]

Sgt. Lawless was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions during the withdrawal. His citation reads:

“During a raid Sergeant Lawless bayoneted the men at 2 enemy machine guns which were firing upon our raiding party and put several others out of action with hand grenades.”

Casualties were heavy and included Lt. Corey and 29 men missing from the battalion. Sixteen men were killed, five officers and seventy-two enlisted men were wounded.[x] Total casualties for the entire 310^th were 191killed and wounded; this included casualties from the German artillery fire.[xi] Lt. Corey died of his wounds in German hands. At least one of the missing men, Cpl. William C. Crouch, was later listed as killed in action, although his body was not recovered.[xii]

The Third battalion brought back between eight and eleven prisoners.[xiii] Members of the experienced 31^st Division, they appeared well fed and seemed glad to be out of the war once they had overcome their initial fear of being captured by Americans. A review of their correspondence revealed no unusual conditions on the German home front.[xiv]

Not surprisingly, the division and regimental histories were sure the Third had inflicted heavier casualties than they’d suffered. The raid was praised as being made “with splendid spirit and dash”.[xv] The night of Sept. 23^rd, the 310^th sent out patrols to find any sign of the missing men, but nothing was found. The regiment assumed they were captured.[xvi]

Overall, the 78^th’s first attack had been less than successful: Mon Plaisir Farm was still a formidable defensive position, 191 casualties were suffered and a handful of prisoners were taken.

Much of the fault lies with the IV Corps ordering a raid by largely inexperienced troops to be carried out within 24 hours. By the time the 310^th had ordered the raid, there were only a few hours of daylight to plan. No doubt this was a key factor in the failure of Company C 303^rd Engineers in reaching the jumping-off position in time. There seems to have been no attempt to delay or cancel the raid, or to adequately protect the flanks of the retreating raiders. The actions of the men in the machine gun company seems to have saved a number of lives, but seems to be attributable to the personal heroism rather than an effective plan to cover the withdrawal.

Despite claims that they gave better than they received, it would appear the more experienced Germans had called in artillery fire and then simply fallen back before the American raid, rushing back to fire on the retiring raiders.

The raid on Mon Plaisir Farm was quickly lost in time as the events of the Meuse Argonne Offensive overshadowed it. But for the draftees of the 310^th Infantry, it was an attack they would never forget.

---

[i]  “Squandered Victory,” James Hallas, page 215-217

[ii] “The 78^th Division in the World War,” Thomas Meehan, page 75

[iii] Ibid, page 75

[iv] A History of the 310^th  Infantry of the Seventy-Eighth Division U.S.A. 1917-1919, Association of the 310^th Infantry New York, page 74

[v] 78^th Division Summary of Operations of the World War. page 13

[vi] A History of the 310^th., page 75

[vii] Ibid, page 75

[viii] Ibid, page 75

[ix] Ibid, page76

[x] Ibid, page 76

[xi] Ibid, page 227

[xii] New York State Archives Summary of Service Card, William C. Crouch, Rochester,  N.Y.  Cpl Crouch is commemorated by the American Battlefield Monuments Commission on the Tablets of the missing at St. Mihiel American Cemetery, Thiaucourt, France.

[xiii] The History of the 78^th, page 75 states 8; The History of the 310^th, page 77 states  11.

[xiv] “Squandered Victory,” page 215

[xv] The History of the 78^th, page 75

[xvi] A History of the 310^th, page 77

Fightin’ Fridays: Mametz Wood

By Graham Corgan.

“Let us respect their endeavours. Let our memories live on”

The Welsh 38th Division was formed from several Regiments including men from the Royal Welsh Fusiliers and the Royal Welsh Regiment. They were answering the call to arms by David Lloyd George and enlisted eagerly expecting exciting wartime adventures.

They were, however, poorly trained, ill-equipped and badly commanded. When planning the forthcoming attack on Mametz Wood, the generals calculated it would be a battle of a few hours; it would, in fact, last for five days. They failed to take into account the fact that the wood was defended with trench systems, machine gun posts and mortars. Manning these positions were men from the Lehr Regiment of the Prussian Guard, who were well-trained and well-armed and very determined.

On the 7th July 1916, the 38th Welsh Division were given orders to capture Mametz Wood. The Division were tasked to leave their trenches and to advance towards a position called the Hammerhead. The distance to cover was maybe 300-400 yards; this distance was to cost them heavily in casualties and even led to them having their bravery questioned.

At 08.30 on the morning of the 7th July, following a preparatory artillery bombardment, they attacked. Initially it appeared the barrage had worked; however, as the men advanced towards the darkened woods, they soon came under heavy machine gunfire from both exposed flanks and they started to take heavy casualties.

The attack ground to a halt, and a second barrage was ordered later that morning. This, too, failed to silence the German machine guns.

Fortunately for the Infantry, a further attack that had been planned for that afternoon was subsequently cancelled as the machine gun posts still remained in position. When the attack ceased, the Division had suffered 400 casualties.

During the 8th and 9^th, men from the 6th Dorset’s Regiment managed to take and hold the Western end of Wood trench; however, seven unsuccessful attempts to take Quadrangle support Trench had by now been made.

On the 10th July, a further attack was planned and, following an artillery barrage, the four Battalions went over the top at 4:15. They attacked the woods between Strip Trench and the Hammerhead following behind a rolling barrage. This time the attack made better progress, and throughout the day vicious hand-to-hand fighting took place in the woods. When night fell, the fighting continued amongst the shattered tree stumps, branches, brambles, barbed wire, trenches and shell holes. German troops were almost pushed out of the woods, but as night fell, they clung to 40 yards of its northern edge. In the confusion of the darkness and destruction, both forces were subjected to heavy shelling from both hostile and friendly fire.

The morning of the 11^th, the Welsh tried to clear the woods of German resistance and a further day of fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued, but still the Germans clung to the very tip of the northern edge of the wood. During that evening, though, they were to withdraw, leaving the woods finally in the hands of the Welsh.

Daybreak on the 12^th, and the woods were in British hands. With a cost nearly 4,000 casualties, the Division was withdrawn from combat, and it would be a year before they would return to the Western Front.

The 38th Division was withdrawn from the line and replaced by the 21st Division.

The men of the Welsh Division were then to be accused of “failing to advance with enough spirit” — in other words, they were named as cowards. Although the statement was later retracted, the damage had been done.

A memorial was only put in place on July 1st 1987 by the South Wales Branch of the Western Front Association. I believe it is one of the most moving memorials on the Somme. The Memorial is not the easiest to find. Google Earth and a sat nav are a must prior and during the trip. You can drive straight past if not careful.

It took me approximately 45 seconds to cover the distance between the Dragon and the Hammerhead. This brought home to me the scale of the losses incurred covering such a small distance. When I reached the tree line and entered the woods, the trenches could still be seen. The years had tried to repair the woods from the damage from those five days 95 years ago, but signs of battle can easily been found. In such a tranquil wood, the only sounds were my footsteps and the songs of the birds — how different from those few days in 1916.

As I stood in one of the remaining trenches and looked back towards the Dragon, it struck me that with the field of fire the Germans had from the woods and the strip trench, the 38th Division’s frontal assault was near suicidal. As I turned to leave the wood, I found a photograph of a Welsh soldier pinned to a tree, a personal tribute to one of the many men who perished in Mametz Wood in July 1916.

Fightin’ Fridays

Today we begin a weekly feature that focuses on single battles within battles, those conflicts that were a blink of an eye in four years of combat, but the most intense day — or the last day — to the men who did the fighting.